In the practice of block cipher design, there seems to have grown a consensus about the diffusion function that designers choose linear functions with large branch numbers to achieve provable bounds against differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, we propose two types of nonlinear functions as alternative diffusing components. One is based on a nonlinear code with parameters (16, 256, 6) which is known as a Kerdock code. The other is a general construction of nonlinear functions based on the T-functions, in particular, two automatons with modular addition operations. We show that the nonlinear functions possess good diffusion properties; specifically, the nonlinear function based on a Kerdock code has a better branch number than any linear counterparts, while the automatons achieve the same branch number as a linear near-MDS matrix. The advantage of adopting nonlinear diffusion layers in block ciphers is that, those functions provide extra confusion effect while a comparable performance in the diffusion effect is maintained. As an illustration, we show the application of the nonlinear diffusion functions in two example ciphers, where a 4-round differential characteristic with the optimal number of active Sboxes has a probability significantly lower (2 16 and 2 10 times, respectively) than that of a similar cipher with a linear diffusion layer. As a result, it sheds light upon an alternative strategy of designing lightweight building blocks.
Introduction
Confusion and diffusion are the main criteria for cryptographic building blocks, especially in the design of block ciphers. A prominent type of block ciphers is the Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN), where the confusion and diffusion are achieved mainly by the substitution boxes (Sboxes) and the permutation layer, respectively. Examples of SPN ciphers are the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [6] and lightweight block ciphers PRESENT [3] , LED [8] , PRINCE [4] to name a few. The popularity of adopting the SPN structure can partially be attributed to the security proof it inherits from the structure, as in the Wide Trail Strategy [5] .
Under such framework, the major feature of a permutation layer to be considered is its branch number which was shown to be related to the minimum distance of an error-correction code. For instance, the diffusion layer of the AES is based on a linear MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) code with length 8, dimension 4 and distance 5 over F 2 8 . Most AES-like ciphers have a diffusion layer based on a linear code.
Despite the evident division of labor for the Sboxes and the linear layer in SPN ciphers, the Wide Trail Strategy does not require that the diffusion layer is linear, see for example [15, p.142] . Intuitively speaking, a nonlinear diffusion layer is able to guarantee a similar provable bounds compared to a linear one with the same branch number, while the confusion of the cipher may benefit as well. However, no alternative to linear diffusion layers has been proposed or studied in the literature in the context of the Wide Trail Strategy. A possible reason is that the properties of the nonlinear error-correcting codes are less explored than the linear ones, which sets limit to the design and the analysis.
In this paper, we present several constructions of nonlinear diffusion layers. One is based on a well-known nonlinear code, a member in the Kerdock code family, which is of length 16, dimension 8 and distance 6 over F 2 . The other one is a generic construction of nonlinear functions with T-functions, which is of theoretical interests and able to generate a number of good nonlinear diffusion functions, such as the nonlinear functions based on modular additions designed in this paper. We study the cryptographic properties of the nonlinear diffusion layers, such as their branch number and differential probabilities. From a practical point of view, we also construct example ciphers to illustrate the advantage of nonlinear diffusion layer to the design of lightweight block ciphers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives notations and definitions used throughout the paper. Section 3 introduces the Kerdock nonlinear codes family, and derives a nonlinear diffusion function based on an instance K(4) with its cryptographic properties analysed. We propose a generic construction of nonlinear functions in Section 4 as well as a rigorous deduction of their branch numbers. In particular, two instances are designed based on modular additions which possess compatible diffusion property as a near-MDS function. To illustrate the advantage of the nonlinear diffusion functions, we show two example ciphers in Section 5, and analyse the minimum number of active Sboxes and the expected differential probability for the differential characteristics. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminary

Notations
Let n, t be positive integers. The j-th bit of an element a ∈ F 2 t is denoted by a[j], and the value of a is shown with numbers in typewriter font. An element in the finite field F n 2 t is represented as a vectorx = {x n−1 , · · · , x 1 , x 0 }, while a vector of length n over Z 2 t the ring of integer modulo 2 t is denoted in bold letters, i.e.,ŷ = {y n−1 , · · · , y 1 , y 0 }. We denote matrices of dimension n × n over a finite field with capital letters, and such matrices over a ring with bold font. Due to a mixture of different additions over finite field F 2 t and ring Z t involved in this paper, we specifically clarify that ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR, and denotes the addition modulo 2 t .
Diffusion Functions and Branch Numbers
Diffusion layers are one of the core components in block ciphers. In the history of designing block ciphers, various diffusion functions have been proposed to meet certain criteria towards optimal diffusion effect. One prominent example is the MixColumns function adopted in the AES [6] , which is based on an MDS code. The function achieves optimal diffusion in terms of the branch number. Branch numbers are often defined for linear functions over finite fields, however, it is possible to define them for general functions. Definition 1. Let (G, ⊗) be an Abelian group, n be an integer. The differential branch number of a (possibly nonlinear) function f : G n → G n is defined as
where + is integer addition, g −1 is the inverse element of g ∈ G and w(·) is the Hamming weight with w(x) = w(
The branch number of a diffusion function is a significant parameter in the provable bounds of security analysis against differential cryptanalysis on block ciphers. It can be shown that 2 ≤ B d (f ) ≤ n + 1 when f is invertible. In recent years, diffusion functions with branch number B d (f ) ≤ n become popular in designing lightweight block ciphers, for instance, PRINCE [4] and MIDORI [1] utilise functions with branch number 4, while PRESENT [3] adopts a bit-shuffling function with branch number 2.
3 A Nonlinear Function Based on the Kerdock Code
Kerdock Codes
Although much less is known about nonlinear error-correcting codes than about linear codes, there are a few examples known with very good properties. Kerdock codes [9, 14] are an example. In order to create a diffusion map similar to MixColumns from a nonlinear code, we put some extra requirements. Firstly, for practical reasons the code should be over an alphabet with size a power of two. Secondly, recall that in AES the action of MixColumns on a single column can be described byŷ = Mx where M is a matrix derived from a generator matrix I M of the corresponding linear code, wherex,ŷ are vectors of length 4 over F 2 8 . In other words, the matrix M is the matrix used to compute the redundancy symbols of the codeword (= output of MixColumns) from the data symbols (= input of MixColumns). Hence, if we use a nonlinear code to define a diffusion map in a similar way, then there should be an explicit formula to compute the redundancy symbols from the data symbols. This means that we need a systematic code. Furthermore, we require that the binary logarithm of the number of codewords equals the length of the codewords, divided by two.
We now explain Kerdock codes following the derivation of [18] . Consider the space V of all bitstrings of length m and let f be a function from V to {0, 1}. Define a codewordĉ f with length n = 2 m as follows:
Then the first-order Reed-Muller code of length n = 2 m is defined as follows: Since the sum of two linear/affine functions is a linear/affine function, it follows that R(1, m) is a linear code. Since there are 2 m+1 linear/affine functions over V , R(1, m) has dimension m + 1. The second-order Reed-Muller code of length n = 2 m is defined as:
Also R(2, m) is a linear code. R(2, m) can also be described as
g is a homogeneous function of degree 2 on V }.
The Kerdock code of length m satisfies R(1, m) ⊂ C ⊂ R(2, m). In fact Kerdock codes can be formed by putting extra conditions on g in (1). A homogeneous function of degree 2 can be described by a quadratic form:
or the corresponding symplectic form:
where B is a symplectic matrix (B = −B t and all elements on the main diagonal are equal to 0). A set of 2 m−1 symplectic (m × m)-matrices (m even) such that the difference of any two matrices of the set is nonsingular is called a Kerdock set. Let m be even and m ≥ 4. Let G be the set of homogeneous functions of degree 2 defined by the 2 m−1 matrices of a Kerdock set according to (2)-(3). Then the Kerdock code of length n = 2 m is defined as follows:
Since there are 2 m+1 choices for f and 2 m−1 choices for g, we obtain that K(m) contains 2 2m codewords. It can be shown that the minimum distance of K(m) equals 2 m−1 − 2 m/2−1 . In addition, all Kerdock codes are systematic. When m = 4, K(4) has length 2 4 = 16 and contains 2 2·4 = 2 8 codewords. It has minimum distance 2 3 −2 2−1 = 6. This code is also known as the Nordstrom-Robinson code [14] . Table 1 illustrates that Kerdock codes for larger m do not satisfy the requirements that we put at the start of this subsection.
Diffusion Function ζ Based on K(4)
Definition 2. We define the diffusion function ζ by stating that, for all 8-bit strings x, the image ζ(x) is the unique 8-bit value y such that the 16-bit value x y is a codeword of K(4). Table 2 in the Appendix gives a tabular representation of ζ.
Diffusion Properties of ζ
Theorem 1. The nonlinear function ζ has differential branch number 6.
Proof. By definition, the differential branch number of the nonlinear function is in fact the minimum distance between the codewords of K(4), which equals 6.
The advantage of the function ζ is two-fold. The minimum distance of a binary linear code with length 16 and dimension 8 is at most 5 [17] , which means ζ achieves better diffusion than any linear layer operating on F 8 2 . In addition, the nonlinearity of ζ may lower the maximum expected differential probability of the optimal characteristics, when ζ is adopted in replace of the linear layer of a cipher. This depends of course on the cipher. For more information on Z 4 -linear codes and their links with nonlinear codes over F 2 , we refer to [17] . We know from Section 3.1 that the diffusion function ζ based on K(4) is quadratic. As a result, its difference distribution table (DDT) has several interesting properties, which reflects the symmetry in the Kerdock codes.
Differential Property of ζ
Before diving into the properties, we introduce a few Lemmata on the interactions among the Gray map, XOR and modular addition. Their correctness can be verified by going over all the cases.
. Let Φ be the Gray map. We have
where e = 00, when v 1 ∈ {0, 2} or v 2 ∈ {0, 2}, 11, otherwise.
Lemma 2. Let y 1 , y 2 ∈ F 2 2 . Φ −1 is the inverse Gray map. We have
where f = 0, when y 1 ∈ {00, 11} or y 2 ∈ {00, 11}, 2, otherwise,
and the multiplications are over Z 4 .
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 show that the behaviour of 0, 2 is different from that of 1, 3 with respect to the Gray map. Therefore, we define the following subsets of Z 4 4 .
Definition 3. The space Z 4 4 can be divided into 16 sets Λ i with 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, where
, 2} when the j-th bit of i is 0, otherwise c j ∈ {1, 3}}. (8) We further denote the binary image of Λ i by λ i .
For example:
, and λ 0 = {00,03,0c,0f,30,33,3c,3f,c0,c3,cc,cf,f0,f3,fc,ff}, where the numbers in typewriter font are hexadecimal notations of 8-bit strings.
Theorem 2. The differential probability of any difference propagation in ζ is 0, 1 or 1/4. In particular, when the input difference is in λ 0 or λ 15 , the output difference is the image of the input difference under ζ and has differential probability 1.
Proof. Letâ,b be the input and output differences which are vectors in F 8 2 . We consider the differential equation:
By Lemma 2, it is equivalent to
With Lemma 1 andf ∈ Λ 0 , the above equation is equivalent to
Therefore, the output difference isb = Φ(M Φ −1 (â)) ⊕ Φ(Mf ) ⊕ê. Next, we discuss the possible values of Φ(Mf ) ⊕ê.
(1) If the input differenceâ ∈ λ 0 , i.e., Φ −1 (â) ∈ Λ 0 . Thenf = 0, andê = 0 since M Φ −1 (â) ∈ Λ 0 (notice that Λ 0 is stable under M , i.e., M Λ 0 = Λ 0 ). Thus, Φ(Mf ) ⊕ê = 0, and we have Φ(M Φ −1 (â)) =b.
, where the multiplication is over Z 4 . Hence, (Mf ) i equals 0 when (M Φ −1 (x)) i ∈ {0, 2} and 2 when (M Φ −1 (x)) i ∈ {1, 3}. Therefore, Φ(Mf ) =ê, and we have Φ(M Φ −1 (â)) =b. 
Since the sum of all the rows is zero, the rank of the matrix is at most 3. Moreover, since there is at least one A i which equals 0 or 2, due to the assumption thatâ ∈ Λ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 14, it can be easily verified that the rank of the matrix is exactly 2. Therefore, there are four possible values that Φ(Mf ) ⊕ê can take:
whenâ ∈ Λ i , i = 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, or the linear span of the above four vectors whenâ ∈ Λ i , i = 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12 (due to that these four expressions only evaluate to two different vectors). Each value appears with probability 1/4. That is to say, for any input differenceâ with Φ −1 (â) ∈ Λ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 14, there are four output differences, and the differential probability is 1/4, which concludes the proof.
Remark 1. Let D 0 be an input difference with 4 output differences D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , D 4 . Then, the output differences propagate to the same set of 4 differences through ζ. For instance, the input difference 01 has the output differences 76, 79, b5, ba, and they have the same output differences 40, 4f, 73, 7c when acting as input difference to the function ζ. We call the propagation of differences {76, 79, b5, ba} to {40, 4f, 73, 7c} a package. Note that the propagations with probability 1 are packages naturally. Furthermore, it can be easily verified with the expressions of the output differences that the packages can be categorised into loops. For instance, the following four packages form a loop of length 4:
{01, 3d, cd, f1} → {76, 79, b5, ba}, {76, 79, b5, ba} → {40, 4f, 73, 7c}, {40, 4f, 73, 7c} → {5e, 6d, 9d, ae}, {5e, 6d, 9d, ae} → {01, 3d, cd, f1}.
A General Construction of Nonlinear Diffusion Functions Based on T-functions
In order to find a systematic nonlinear code (2n, n, d) over a finite field F 2 m , one may start with identifying an appropriate nonlinear bijection f : F n 2 m → F n 2 m , such that the codewords are of the form:ĉ = (x, f (x)),x ∈ F n 2 m . However, there are no guidelines for the choice of the nonlinear functions due to the lack of the generator matrix. Given a certain nonlinear function, it is also time-consuming to find the minimal distance and the weight distribution of the code, since this requires to generate all the codewords and computing the differences of all pairs.
In this section, we consider a general family of nonlinear functions based on the T-functions [10] .
Let k, l ≥ 0 be integers. Let η : F l 2 k → F l 2 k be a nonlinear function y = η(x), whereŷ = (y l−1 , . . . , y 1 , y 0 ) T andx = (x l−1 , . . . , x 1 , x 0 ) T . We define η to be a function such that the j-th bit of each of the y i 1. depends linearly on the j-th bits of x , i.e., x [j] for all 1 ≤ ≤ l.
2. depends in an arbitrary way on the t-th bits of x for any 1 ≤ ≤ l and for t < j 3. does not depend on the t-th bits of x for all 1 ≤ ≤ l and for t > j
and a linear function m j m j :
defined by a matrix M j ∈ F l×l 2 such that
Theorem 3. Let η be a function defined as above. Then η is a permutation if all the matrices M j are invertible. Furthermore, the branch number of η is
Proof. Suppose thatŷ
We consider j 0 ≥ 0 where ∆x j 0 is the first nonzero component of (∆x t−1 , . . . , ∆x 0 ) T . Then, one has ∆x j−1 = 0 for j < j 0 . Therefore,
Invertible: When (∆ŷ k−1 , ∆ŷ t−2 , . . . , ∆ŷ 0 ) T = 0, in particular, ∆ŷ j 0 = 0. Since every M j is invertible, we have ∆x j 0 = 0. By induction, we get (∆x k−1 , ∆x k−2 , . . . , ∆x 0 ) T = 0.
Branch number: When there are α nonzero bits in ∆ŷ j 0 , i.e., the hamming weight of ∆ŷ j 0 is wt(∆ŷ j 0 ) = α, we know that wt(∆ŷ j 0 )+wt(∆x j 0 ) ≥ BN (M j 0 ). Therefore, the branch number of function η:
With the generic construction, one can adjust the nonlinear diffusion function according to the goal of the design, meanwhile the diffusion property of the function is fully under control. As an application, we define two nonlinear diffusion functions based on the modular additions. 
The nonlinear diffusion functions ρ and ψ
Let m ≥ 2 be an integer. In most cases, m equals 4 or 8 according to the size of the Sbox in use. We define a nonlinear function over F 2 m as
where Figure 1(a) gives a visualised description of ρ.
By slightly modifying the function ρ, we define a nonlinear function ψ which is shown as Figure 1 
Diffusion Functions ρ and ψ
As special instances of the general construction, the branch number of the nonlinear functions ρ and ψ can be predicted accordingly. Proof. The modular addition of two elements x y can be written as x ⊕ y ⊕ c(x, y), where the carry function c(·, ·) is a T-function. As a consequence, the update function of ρ, 
which is of branch number 4. Hence, the nonlinear function is invertible with its differential branch number being 4.
Remark 2. Note that ρ is of a similar nature as the Sbox (χ function) adopted in the SHA-3 permutation keccak-f [2] , which is a generalised automaton [19] . Although ρ is invertible, the inverse of ρ seems to be of no simple expression.
The property of the nonlinear function ψ can be analysed analogously as that of ρ. Here, notice that the operations in the nonlinear function ψ are only modular additions, we take a slightly different approach to show the property of ψ as follows.
Theorem 5. ψ is invertible and has differential branch number 4.
Proof. Although ψ is a nonlinear function over F 2 m , it is linear over the ring of integer modulo 2 m , i.e., Z 2 m . Therefore, it has a generator matrix over Z 2 m :
which is near-MDS. As a result, ψ is invertible and its differential branch number is 4.
Due to the linearity over Z 2 m , the inverse of ψ has a simple form with generator matrix Ψ −1 . When m = 4, the update rule of ψ −1 is defined by the generator matrix: 
The function σ has been successfully applied to lightweight block cipher designs such as MI-DORI [1] , and the similarity suggests possible applications of the nonlinear functions ρ and ψ.
5 Example Ciphers with a Nonlinear Diffusion Layer
Nonlinear Diffusion Function ζ
The diffusion layer based on the Kerdock nonlinear function operates on bits. In order to fully utilise the diffusion property, we provide here an example cipher with 128-bit block size as shown in Figure 2 . The 128-bit block is arranged as a 3-dimensional state with rows, columns and lanes of length 4, 8, and 4, respectively. The cipher has two different round functions. For odd-numbered rounds, the round function is defined as follows: • MixColumns: 16 applications of the nonlinear map ζ derived from K(4) on each column
• AddKey: a 128-bit key is XORed into the state and for even-numbered rounds it is as follows:
• SubCells: 32 applications of the Sbox on each row
• MixLanes: 32 applications on each lanes of the linear function σ : F 4 2 → F 4 2 as Equation (11).
• AddKey: a 128-bit key is XORed into the state To evaluate the bound for the number of active Sboxes in the cipher, we performed an automatic search of differential characteristics, adopting a similar method as [16] . Denote the 4-bit differences before and after each SubCells layer by a r i and b r i , where 0 ≤ r ≤ n stands for the round number and 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 labels the Sboxes. Model the propagation of (a r i → b r i ) by the DDT table of the Sbox. For odd-numbered rounds, the difference propagation of (b r i → a r+1 i
) follows Theorem 2. For even-numbered rounds, the MixLanes operation is linear, therefore, the propagation of differences is straightforward.
It is shown by the automatic search that the minimum number of active Sboxes in a 4-round differential characteristic is 24, while the number is 20 with a linear diffusion layer where the branch number is at most 5.
Furthermore, the probability of a differential characteristic with optimal number of active Sboxes can be much lower than what is provided by the Sboxes solely. For instance, we show a 4-round characteristic with 24 active Sboxes in Figure 3 . To simplify the view, the differences over the cells are of 4-bit which represent the hexadecimal values of the bits in a row of the cipher, and a blank cell stands for a zero difference.
The 24 active Sboxes lead to a differential probability of 2 −61 (taking into account the propagations of probability 2 −3 ). Moreover, we define the nonlinear diffusion functions being effectively active if the difference propagations are of nonzero probability which is less than 1 (the propagations with probability 1 have no effective contribution). It is obvious that there are 8 effectively active nonlinear diffusion functions, which counts for an additional probability of 2 −16 . Therefore, the overall expected differential probability of the characteristic is 2 −77 .
Remark 4. The cipher we propose here has a certain similarity to previous designs such as the LS-designs [7] which are of dimension 2 and the block cipher 3D [13] .
Nonlinear Diffusion Function ρ and ψ
The nonlinear functions ρ and ψ operate on F 4 2 m , therefore, they can be adopted similarly as most MixColumns operations in the AES-like designs. We illustrate an application of the nonlinear diffusion function ρ in the following 64-bit cipher. The round function consists the following operations:
• SubCells: a 4-bit Sbox (the Sbox of PRESENT) is applied on each cell • MixColumns: ρ is applied to each column of the state
• KeyAdd: a 64-bit key is XORed to the state Despite its similarity to MIDORI, the cipher we propose here has the operation ShiftBits, which is uncommon for Sbox-based ciphers. The main target of ShiftBits is to avoid trivial propagations of differences through the MixColumns operation where the modular additions are not effectively activated. The difference propagation through modular addition can be efficiently modelled with a SAT/SMT language similar to the techniques in [11, 12] . As a result, we track the propagation of the differences through the round function, and obtain that when the rotational offset r is 3, an optimal differential characteristic of 4 rounds has a probability 2 −42 . Comparing to MIDORI64 with at least 16 active Sboxes after 4 rounds leading to a differential probability 2 −32 [1] , the modular additions of ρ contribute significantly to the resistance against differential cryptanalysis.
Remark 5. The main focus of these example ciphers is the nonlinear diffusion layer, therefore, we ignore the specification of their key schedule. By experiment, one can show that the linear branch number of the function ζ is 6 and those of ρ, ψ are 4 when the operating over 4-bit words. Hence, for simplicity and illustrative purpose, we only concentrate on analysing differential characteristics of the ciphers.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose several nonlinear functions with good diffusion property, which can be adopted as a replacement of the linear layers in designing block ciphers to provide both diffusion and confusion. We investigate a nonlinear function derived from the Kerdock codes, and two nonlinear functions of an automaton structure based on modular additions, which are derived from a generic construction of nonlinear functions based on T-functions proposed in this paper. We prove that the diffusion property in terms of the branch number has a comparable or even better effect with the consideration of their linear counterparts.
To show an application of nonlinear diffusion layers, the diffusion effect of the nonlinear function is illustrated in two example ciphers. Due to the improved diffusion of the ζ function, a higher bound on the minimum number of the active Sboxes is guaranteed. Moreover, the confusion effect is further boosted by the probabilistic propagations of differences through the nonlinear diffusion layer.
A future line of work may focus on constructing nonlinear diffusion functions suitable for various designing preferences, as well as a better trade-off between the diffusion and confusion effect of a nonlinear diffusion function when interacting with the Sboxes and (possibly also) the linear functions. In terms of the resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis, it is promising to design lightweight ciphers which reach the security requirement with fewer rounds.
